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EXECUTING THE LAWS OR EXECUTING AN AGENDA.
USURPATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS BY THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Christopher C. Sabis*
The Department ofJustice (DOJ) can compel individuals and entities to sacrifice
their constitutional or statutory rights. The DOJ can do so through brute political
force, settlements and consent decrees, selective statutory enforcement, and prosecu-
tions that coerce future actors not to pursue goals contrary to the policy desires of
the executive branch. The current regime provides few constraints on the DOJ's
ability to abuse its legal authority to achieve political objectives. This unbridled
power jeopardizes the rights of both opposing and third parties.
This Note examines, in a bipartisan manner, the methods the Justice Department
employs that deprive opponents or third parties of statutory or constitutional
rights. It weighs the need for efficient law enforcement against the government's
duty to protect individual and group liberties. The Note concludes that the current
legal checks on DOJ power are insufficient. Congress should continue its present
system of legislative policing and pass a modified version of the Tunney Act to
limit DOJ abuses beyond the antitrust field.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over recent decades, political life in the United States has been
shaped by a marked expansion of executive branch power. Recent
examples include executive agencies attempting to expand the
scope of their regulatory powers and the Office of the President
itself claiming expanded authority in areas such as foreign affairs.'
The legislative and judicial branches have been passive in the face
of this movement and have even endorsed the expansion of presi-
dential authority. One means through which the executive branch
* Associate, Hale and Dorr LLP; B.A. 2000, University of Rochester; J.D. 2003,
Georgetown University Law Center. The author would like to thank Professor Charles
Abernathy for presenting the idea for this topic, and for reviewing drafts and providing
valuable feedback. He would also like to thank Mike Sapoznikow and Jacy D'Aiutolo for
their invaluable comments and help in editing.
1. See, e.g., Christopher C. Sabis, Note, Congress and the Treaty Power: An Originalist Ar-
gument Against Unilateral Presidential Termination of the ABM Treaty, 31 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
PoL'Y. 223 (2002); Stuart TaylorJr., Bad Aftertaste: The FDA Tobacco Case May Have Unsatisfying
Outcome, Wioever Wins, LEGAL TIMES, May 10, 1999, at 21 (discussing attempts by the Food
and Drug Administration to begin regulating tobacco products).
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wields its power is legal action by the Department ofJustice (DOJ).'
This follows naturally, since the Constitution charges the executive
branch with enforcing the laws of the United States. However,
power to enforce the law begets the ability to abuse that power.
The DOJ, using standard tools at its disposal, has the ability to
compel individuals and entities to sacrifice their constitutional or
statutory rights. Many scholars recognize the difficulties created by
these powers of the DOJ, but most accept them with either con-
tentment or frustration. As prosecutors have near complete control
over the cases they bring, some may accept these uses of prosecu-
torial discretion as standard and not problematic. Individuals and
entities can voluntarily sacrifice their rights in settlements that are
not subject to judicial review. As this article will describe, the De-
partment can use selective statutory enforcement, brute political
force, settlements and consent decrees, and prosecutions that co-
erce future actors not to pursue goals contrary to the policy desires
of the executive branch.
This paper examines the methods the DOJ employs to deprive a
party opponent or third party of statutory or constitutional rights.
It then considers whether our government should delegate such
wide discretion to the Attorney General in bringing and settling
actions. Section II of this paper details four specific methods that
the DOJ can use to exploit executive authority and provides exam-
ples of each type of abuse. Section III examines the policy
arguments for and against the DOJ having the unchecked author-
ity described in Section II. Section WY analyzes potential measures
that are available to check the DOJ's authority in these matters.
Finally, Section V concludes that, while broad executive discretion
is inevitable, Congress should legislate to prevent the DOJ from
taking actions that unnecessarily infringe on the statutory or con-
stitutional rights of litigants and third parties.
2. See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Federal Policy Making By Consent Decree: An Analysis of Agency
andJudicialDiscretion, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 241, 241 (1987).
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.C1.
4. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae United States Telephone Assoc. at n.15, United
States v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va., 1994 U.S. Briefs 1893 (1995) ("Because the
restriction was the result of a voluntary settlement, it was not subject to First Amendment
challenge.").
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II. ABUSIVE TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED BY THE DOJ
Of the many methods available to the DOJ to enforce the Con-
stitution and laws of the United States, four are particularly
susceptible to abuse. These are selective statutory enforcement,
brute political force, settlements and consent decrees, and prose-
cutions that coerce future actors not to pursue goals contrary to
the policy desires of the executive branch. In carrying out its du-
ties, the DOJ uses these methods to usurp statutory and
constitutional liberties. Defining these practices and recounting
recent examples of their use can illustrate the overall policy prob-
lem and demonstrate how the DOJ undermines the laws it is sworn
to enforce.
A. Selective Enforcement of Statutory Law
Conservatives and liberals often have different priorities in law
enforcement. These disparities were apparent during the confir-
mation hearings of Attorney General John Ashcroft. Ashcroft told
Congress that, despite his conservative ideals, he would not work to
overturn Roe v. Wade and that he would vigorously enforce the civil
rights laws. His promises met with skepticism from Democrats, in-
cluding a cutting jibe from Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY).
You know, Senator (Ashcroft), I sit here and listen to the hear-
ing, and my jaw almost drops. Senator Ashcroft believes that
Roe v. Wade is the settled law of the land? Senator Ashcroft be-
lieves that the assault weapons ban should be continued? You
know, Senator, we fought a lot of these battles in the Senate
over the last two years. Where were you when we needed you?6
Despite Ashcroft's assertions that "no part of the Department of
Justice was more important than the Civil Rights Division, ' ' 7 it is
difficult to believe that the Ashcroft DOJ will enforce statutes such
as the Fair Housing Ace (FHA) as aggressively as the DOJ did un-
der former Attorney General Janet Reno. Under Reno, the DOJ
5. Jim Oliphant, Ashcroft's Redemption Ticket, LEGAL TIMEs,Jan. 22, 2001, at 1.
6. Id. at 15.
7. Id.
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2003).
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undertook an unprecedented campaign to enforce the Act.9 This
campaign illustrates how different policy preferences compel dif-
ferent enforcement standards and how zealous law enforcement
can push the boundaries of legislative intent.
After Bill Clinton took office as President, enforcement of the
FHA became a DOJ priority. The goal of these prosecutions was to
reform the business practices of most real estate entities by bring-
ing a small number of high-profile cases. '° However, in order to
make these cases high profile, the DOJ had to enter consent de-
crees that "reflect[ed] an aggressive DOJ interpretation of the
reach of the Fair Housing Act, and impose [d] significant damages
and penalties.""
Naturally conservatives are going to interpret a statute's reach
differently from liberals; it is a matter of interpretation whether the
DOJ's application of the Act was inappropriate in any particular
instance. However, some of the consent decrees reveal remedies
that appear to stretch the Fair Housing Act beyond the goals au-
thorized by Congress. For example, in August 1995, the DOJ
settled a FHA case with the owners of a North Miami Beach, Flor-
ida apartment complex. The Department alleged that the complex
charged African-American residents higher rents than it charged
white residents, and that prospective black tenants were falsely in-
formed that there were no apartments available for rent.'2 As part
of the settlement, the apartment owners agreed to pay $650,000 to
HOPE [Housing Opportunities Project for Excellence] and the
individual plaintiffs and $200,000 in civil penalties to the U.S.
treasury; create two funds totaling $375,000 to compensate any in-
dividuals who may subsequently be identified as victims of the
discrimination; advertise in local papers to locate possible victims
of the discrimination; and, fund future testing by HOPE.' 3 The
damages Jose Milton, the owner of the apartments, paid to indi-
vidual victims and to HOPE totaled $1.2 million. 1
4
While this settlement successfully furthered 'the Clinton Admini-
stration's fair housing policy, it circumvents the Fair Housing Act's
limits on court-ordered monetary damages in civil actions brought
9. Andrew J. Sandler, Fair Housing Campaign: DOJ Takes Aggressive Stance on Housing
Discrimination, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 21, 1997, at S42.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 543.
13. Press Release, Department of Justice, South Florida Apartment Owner Who Re-
fused to Rent to African Americans to Pay $1.2 Million Under Justice Department
Settlement (August 30, 1995) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/Pre_96/August95/
460.txt.html (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
14. Id.
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by the DOJ. The Fair Housing Act caps civil penalties for repeat
offenders at $100,000:'5 Milton paid double that, $200,000, in civil
penalties in this settlement. Furthermore, while not clearly con-
trary to the statute, the $1.2 million total damage award seems high
in light of the relatively low civil penalties authorized by the Act.
The disbursement to HOPE also constitutes a somewhat broad in-
terpretation of the Act's authorization of an award of "such other
relief as the court deems appropriate."'' 6 It is apparent that the
DOJ, through settlement, obtained a more favorable result than it
would have had it gone to trial for enforcement of the statute.
In addition to inflated monetary awards, the DOJ also compelled
many of the parties with whom it settled to take affirmative action-
like steps "to encourage minority applications and make them-
selves more hospitable to minority residents., 17 One example of
this is a January 1996 settlement that, in addition to monetary
damages, required seven mobile park homes in California to "hire
a fair housing organization to conduct testing of the mobile home
parks; implement a fair housing training program; notify the pub-
lic that they welcome families with children, and; submit periodic
compliance reports.""' Had this case made it to trial, the appropri-
ate relief provision of 42 U.S.C. § 3614(d)(1)(b) might have
allowed this type of remedy. However, it is unclear if a judge would
have granted such relief.
Arguably, the DOJ's Fair Housing Act settlements throughout
the 1990's exceeded Congress's intended remedies. This aggressive
stance demonstrates that the zeal with which the executive en-
forces the law can affect the law itself. While the potential systemic
problem is apparent in cases where the DOJ is seeking high-profile
settlements, it is less obvious when the Department subtly mini-
mizes its efforts in certain areas of enforcement. Thus, by
aggressively enforcing certain laws and ignoring others, the DOJ
can affect the substance of the law itself.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 3614(d) (1) (C) (ii) (2003).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 3614(d)(1)(B) (2003).
17. Sandier, supra note 9, at 543.
18. Press Release, Department ofJustice, Mobile Home Park Owners to Pay More than
$2 Million For Allegedly Discriminating Against Families with Children (Jan. 23, 1996),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1996/Januar196/012.txt (on file with the Univer-
sity of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
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B. Use of Brute Political Force
While the selective enforcement problem involves litigation, the
DOJ does not necessarily need to threaten litigation to compel a
result that may violate statutory or constitutional rights. As an ex-
ecutive branch department, the DOJ has a great deal of coercive
political power at its disposal. Parties often do not want conflicts
with political subdivisions of the US Government, or with actors or
parties within the Government. They may fear retaliatory interfer-
ence in future interactions with the political infrastructure.1' By
exercising political power, the DOJ can enforce its policy agenda,
even in legally questionable circumstances, without involving the
judicial branch.
1. The DOJ and Playboy Magazine-The DOJ Reagan-era dispute
with Playboy is one example of its ability to abuse political influ-
ence to achieve a policy objective. In 1986, Playboy magazine filed
suit against the DOJ claiming that the Department, under Attorney
General Edwin Meese, had violated the magazine's First Amend-
ment rights.0 Meese chaired the Commission on Pornography,
which he founded within the DOJ. On February 11, the Commis-
sion warned retailers to cease carrying Playboy Magazine or the
Commission would report them as distributors of pornography;
5,000 7-Eleven stores subsequently stopped selling the magazine.
Playboy alleged that the Commission had coerced a total of 15,000
retailers to stop selling Playboy magazine. 2' Though the DOJ attor-
ney said there was no First Amendment violation because the
Commission was merely advisory and could not exert "coercive
government power," it nonetheless acted quickly to settle the case
out of court.
22
The DOJ's eagerness to settle may be an indication that, while it
put up a brave front, it feared that its approach had violated the
First Amendment. Twenty-three years prior in Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan,5 the Supreme Court considered whether Rhode Island
could actively encourage vendors not to carry certain forms of con-
19. See, e.g, Shane, supra note 2, at 272 ("[A]n agency's settlement may be shaped
more by the agency's internal political agenda or by its responsiveness to an ongoing rela-
tionship with the suing party or parties than by a faithful, disinterested assessment of the
most appropriate implementation of its statutory responsibilities.").
20. NY TIMEs News Service, U.S. Tries to Settle Suit with Playboy, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 8, 1986,
at C4.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
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stitutionally protected speech that might be "objectionable" for
viewing by underage children. 4 Writing for a majority of the Court,
Justice Brennan found that this system constituted an unconstitu-
tional prior restraint on speech. 5 The Commission's actions in the
Playboy case were almost identical to those of Rhode Island in Sulli-
van.
Ultimately, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
granted a permanent injunction to Playboy. 6 Even if the Commis-
sion's actions were unconstitutional, this situation shows the
potential for unconstitutional results through the coercive actions
of the DOJ. Since many entities have repeated interactions with the
executive branch they are unlikely to contest every such use of
27power.
2. The Strength of Political Coercion-An Illustrative Exercise of
Potential Power-While it may or may not have been abusive in it-
self, the Clinton-ADA settlement illustrates the potential for abuses
due to coercive political power in private settlements as well. In
1992, Bill Clinton's Presidential Campaign booked several rooms
in the Hotel Inter-Continental New York.28 The campaign did not
realize that the Hotel was, at that time, subject to a DOJ complaint
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) .2 Apparently, the
Hotel had not removed barriers preventing access for disabled in-
dividuals.0
This situation was potentially embarrassing for both Bill Clinton
and the Democratic Party. A representative of the group Disabled
in Action, the citizen group that had filed the complaint with the
DOJ, noted that "things started rolling" as soon as the Clinton
Campaign realized its blunder.3' The Campaign, the Hotel, and the
complainants eventually reached a settlement under which the ho-
tel would become ADA compliant by a certain date. In return, the
group dropped its complaint with the DOJ and agreed not to "en-
gage in any form of public protest" in the vicinity of the hotel while
Clinton and his campaign were staying there.2
24. Id. at 59-61.
25. Id. at 70-71.
26. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Meese, 639 F. Supp. 581 (D.D.C. 1986).
27. See, e.g., Shane, supra note 2.
28. Susan Harrigan, HotelDispute Ironed Out, NEWSDAY,June 30, 1992, at 27.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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Since Disabled in Action achieved its goal and Bill Clinton and
the Democrats avoided a major embarrassment, many would say
the settlement was successful and efficient. However, the situation
does demonstrate that political power can coerce a party to sacri-
fice a constitutional right. Disabled in Action must have known
that if Bill Clinton won the presidency, it would have repeat deal-
ings with his administration in regards to the ADA. Had it been
tougher in this settlement and insisted on maintaining its right to
protest in order to highlight its cause, there could have been retri-
bution from the Clinton administration. By allowing the future
President to save face, Disabled in Action may have gained political
influence and put itself in a position to benefit in the long term.
The potential political power of the presidency and the many
subdivisions within the executive branch can coerce a private entity
to sacrifice a fundamental Constitutional right. In the DIA case,
Bill Clinton did not even need to be president to use the power he
had the potential to inherit. In the Playboy case, Playboy was effec-
tively a third party, as it was the 7-Eleven stores and other retailers
who were threatened with political action if they continued to carry
the magazines. These two scenarios, read together, illustrate how
easy it is for the DOJ to abuse the political power inherent in the
executive branch, and directly or indirectly usurp the rights of an
individual or group.
C. Legislation by Consent Decree
As noted in Section II-B, the DOJ often enforces statutory law
through consent decrees, which give the DOJ the power to selec-
tively enforce certain congressional legislation. A further problem
with DOJ consent decrees is that they can ignore or usurp an estab-
lished standard of constitutional or statutory law. Though reviewed
by the presiding judge in the case, consent decrees are not subject
to the same level of scrutiny as a case that goes to trial. In a consent
decree,
the private settlement is not scrutinized in the same way as a
judgment on the merits. Rather, the court must accept the set-
tlement unless there is evidence of procedural unfairness,
unreasonableness, or inadequacy. The only grounds on which
to vacate a consent decree are fraud, lack of consent, or lack
33. NY TIMES News Service, supra note 20.
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of jurisdiction ... [W]ith a consent decree, courts will not
scrutinize the merits.34
In 1987, Peter M. Shane, a Professor of Law at the University of
Iowa, noted that these consent decrees also raise questions when
they bind future executive branch actions, limiting the discretion
of future executives to enforce the laws as they see fit.
3 5
1. The Criminal Context-Individuals may freely give up their
rights in a voluntary settlement. However, what appears to be a
voluntary sacrifice of a Constitutional or statutory right may, when
litigating against the DOJ, actually be coerced. In the criminal con-
text, one right a defendant may be coerced into sacrificing is the
statutory right to appeal a sentence imposed by a trial court. 6
Over the last several years, the DOJ has relied heavily on plea
agreements in enforcing criminal law. As part of these plea
agreements, the Department has often required defendants to
waive their right to appeal their sentence under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(a) .3 This does not seem peculiar on its face since the Su-
preme Court has held that criminal defendants can legally sacrifice
34. Michael P. O'Mullan, Note, Seeking Consistency in Judicial Review of Securities Arbitra-
tion: An Analysis of the Manifest Disregard of the Law Standard, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1121, 1149
(1995) (citing Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 324 (1928); United States v. Metro.
St. Louis Sewer Dist., 952 E2d 1040 (8th Cir. 1992); Sierra Club v. Electronic Controls De-
sign, Inc., 909 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1990)). But see Frazar v. Gilbert, 300 F.3d 530, 537,
540 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that a consent decree between a plaintiff and a State could not
be enforced if its provisions were incompatible with statute and such enforcement would
violate the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution), cert. granted Frew v. Hawkins, 123 S.Ct.
1481 (2003).
35. Shane, supra note 2.
36. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) (2000) gives the defendant the fight to appeal "an otherwise
final sentence if the sentence-
was imposed in violation of law; or
was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines; or
is greater than the sentence specified in the applicable guideline range to the extent
that the sentence includes a greater fine or term of imprisonment, probation, or su-
pervised release than the maximum established in the guideline range, or includes a
more limiting condition of probation or supervised release under section 3563(b) (6)
or (b) (11) than the maximum established in the guideline range; or
was imposed for an offense for which there is no sentencing guideline and is plainly
unreasonable."
37. Mark Flanagan & Christina M. Carroll, Getting Greedy: Justice Department Asks too
Much in Waivers Under Plea Agreement, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 1, 2001, (Practice Focus), at 32.
38. Id.
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even Constitutional rights in plea agreements.3 ' Accordingly, fed-
eral circuits have generally found statutory waivers to be
enforceable a. 4 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, per-
haps responding to the increased use of these waivers in recent
years, has decided that such waivers should be examined on a case-
by-case basis.41
In United States v. Teeter,42 the First Circuit acknowledged its break
with precedent and instituted a stricter level of judicial scrutiny of
§ 3742(a) waivers.43 Teeter involved a woman charged with multiple
criminal counts, including conspiracy and two counts of use of a
firearm in a violent crime.44 Although the court found the defen-
dant's waiver of the right to appeal her sentence was valid,4' it held
that
plea-agreement waivers of the right to appeal from imposed
sentences are presumptively valid (if knowing and voluntary),
but are subject to a general exception under which the court
of appeals retains inherent power to relieve the defendant of
the waiver, albeit on terms that are just to the government,
where a miscarriage ofjustice occurs.46
The First Circuit acknowledged that these agreements allow the
government to conserve resources, and that the defendant receives
a benefit in exchange for sacrificing her statutory right to appeal. 7
However, the court seemed concerned by the appellant's argument
that such waivers are anticipatory. "At the time the defendant signs
the plea agreement," wrote the court, "she does not have a clue as
to the nature and magnitude of the sentencing errors that may be
visited upon her."4 8 The court agreed with appellant that this makes
these waivers unique from other waivers of statutory and constitu-
39. See, e.g., Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 393 (1987) (defendants may
waive constitutional rights as part of a plea agreement); Adams v. United States, 317 U.S.
269, 275 (1942) (criminal defendant can waive the right to a jury trial); Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464-67 (1938) (criminal defendant can waive the right to counsel).
40. Flanagan, supra note 37.
41. Id. The use of these waivers has become systemic in the executive branch. Both the
U.S. Attorney's Manual § 9-16.330 (2000) and The Department of Justice Criminal Proce-
dure Manual § 626 encourage government attorneys to include these waivers in plea-
agreements.
42. 257 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2001).
43. Id. at 26. For one precedent with a contrary holding, see United States v. Main, 961
F.2d 493 (4th Cir. 1992).
44. Id. at 20.
45. Id. at 18.
46. Id. at 25-26.
47. Id. at 22.
48. Id. at 21.
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tional rights often found in plea agreements. 49 Such broad waivers
can have the overall effect of damaging sentencing integrity and
depriving defendants of their liberty.5
The First Circuit did not directly discuss the possibility of coer-
cion by the Federal Government in obtaining these plea waivers
and expressed a hope to apply its somewhat amorphous "miscar-
riage of justice" test sparingly.5' However, the imbalance of power
between the DOJ and the underpaid, overworked public defenders
is often striking.5 2 While parties may enter such agreements "know-
ingly and willingly," there is inherent coercion resulting from the
disparity of information and resources between the parties. These
problems are becoming clear to legal commentators, particularly
those focusing on white-collar crime. These commentators believe
a defendant cannot enter into such an agreement knowingly be-
cause it is impossible to accurately predict the sentence a
defendant will receive. 3
The Teeter case represents an emerging acknowledgement of the
coercive nature and, at times, unjust results of these agreements.
This trend began in 1997 when the Second Circuit adopted a stan-
dard for appeal waivers similar to (and possibly more stringent
than) that pronounced in Teeter, holding that it would examine on
a case-by-case basis plea-agreement appeal waivers. In the same
month, the District Court for the District of Columbia first decided
that these agreements were presumptively invalid because no de-
fendant could possibly enter into them knowingly.55 In response,
49. See id. at 21.
50. Flanagan, supra note 37.
51. See Teeter, 257 E3d at 26.
52. See generally Cait Clarke, Problem-Solving Defenders in the Community: Expanding the
Conceptual and Institutional Boundaries of Providing Counsel to the Poor, 14 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS
401 (2001); Brenna K DeVaney, The "No-Contact" Rule: Helping or Hurting Criminal Defendants
in Plea Negotiations?, 14 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 933 (2001); Inga L. Parsons, "Making It a Fed-
eral Case": A Model For Indigent Representation, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 837 (1997).
53. Flanagan, supra note 37. While affected by these waivers, those involved in white-
collar litigation may have less to complain about in these cases than indigent defendants, as
the defendants themselves are more educated and have more resources at their disposal.
See Sections III's policy analysis for further discussion of the factors at issue in these types of
cases.
54. United States v. Rosa, 123 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1997) ("[P]lea agreements are sub-
ject to the public policy constraints that bear upon the enforcement of other kinds of
contracts.").
55. United States v. Johnson, 992 F. Supp. 437 (D.C.C. 1997); United States v. Raynor,
989 E Supp. 43 (D.D.C. 1997). This presumption, was later adopted by a Massachusetts Dis-
trict Court in United States v. Perez, 46 F Supp. 2d 59 (D. Mass. 1999), setting the stage for its
rejection by the First Circuit in 7eter.
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the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia altered its
policy favoring such agreements.
56
Current Supreme Court precedent maintains that criminal de-
fendants can waive statutory and constitutional rights. The DOJ
already has advantages over criminal defendants, such as the in-
admissibility of Government admissions5 7 and superiority of
available resources and institutional knowledge. As the power and
wherewithal of the executive branch continue to grow in compari-
son to the time and resources of public defenders, the issue of
whether the legislature or the Court itself should override this pol-
icy becomes more important. If this imbalance is readily apparent,
similar concerns arise involving other statutory and constitutional
rights negotiated away by defendants during their interactions with
the DOJ.
2. The Civil Context-The ability of the DOJ to bypass constitu-
tional or statutory law is as apparent in the context of civil cases as
in that of criminal cases. The previous subsection discussed this
problem in the context of a party-defendant. This subsection illus-
trates the same problem in a civil context by showing that consent
decrees can usurp third parties' rights to litigate. One such exam-
ple is a 1980's segregation case in Bakersfield, California.
The Bakersfield school district had operated a segregated system
since the 1950's.5' During the Nixon Administration, the district
was pressured to desegregate and, in 1978, Administrative Law
Judge John Ohanian issued a two-hundred and twenty page ruling
finding that the "Bakersfield City Schools had intentionally and by
law created a system that segregated black and Hispanic elemen-
tary students from white students."59 Despite agreement between
Carter and Reagan administration officials that busing would be
necessary to desegregate four of the city's schools, the Reagan DOJ
refused to work toward that goal. 60 Instead, the DOJ settled with
Bakersfield.
56. Flanagan, supra note 37 (further noting that the D.C. Circuit has yet to rule on this
issue). Flanagan and Carroll also note that similar concerns have arisen concerning waivers
of rights to Brady evidence. See United States v. Ruiz, 241 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
that waivers to Brady evidence in plea agreements are invalid because, since the defendant
does not know what the evidence is, it cannot be a knowing and intelligent waiver).
57. See Anne Bowen Poulin, Party Admissions in Criminal Cases: Should the Government
Have to Eat its Words, 87 MINN. L. REv. 401 (2002).
58. Judith Cummings, Voluntary Desegregation of Schools Divides Bakersfield, Calif., N.Y.
TiMES, Feb. 12, 1984, at 28.
59. Id.
60. Id. This was probably due to President Reagan's opposition to busing.
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The two parties agreed to a system of voluntary transfers and
magnet programs. ' The first of the two magnet programs was a
Short Term Mini Magnet Program "whereby fourth, fifth, and sixth
grade students from varied ... backgrounds come together for
programs designed to provide concentrated, short term enrich-
ment experiences and enhance academic achievement, social
awareness, and racial harmony.2 The second program, a full term
program, included magnet school programs such as extended day
programming, computer assisted instruction, science concentra-
63tions, and creative and performing arts programs.
While the consent decree may have reflected the policy desires
of the Reagan Administration, it may not have satisfied the consti-
tutional requirements that the Attorney General is bound to
implement. Judge Ohanian found that Bakersfield had intention-
ally run a segregated school system for over thirty years.6 By 1984,
in cases where intentional segregation had taken place over a pe-
riod of years, courts had held that the Constitution requires more
than voluntary measures such as those agreed to in the Bakersfield
settlement. 65 Even after voluntary measures were taken in response
to Judge Ohanian's opinion, four of the district's schools remained
segregated. It is in exactly these kinds of cases, where voluntary
measures have not completely solved a decades-old segregation
problem, that courts have imposed an "affirmative duty" on the
district to resolve the situation.66
While constitutional standards are always open to debate, the
Bakersfield settlement was a particularly weak enforcement
mechanism for the DOJ in light of the case law. It is likely that the
administration could have gone further to secure the complete
61. Id.
62. Consent Decree, United States v. Bakersfield School Dist., January 25, 1984 (E.D.
Cal.) at 4-5.
63. Id. at 6.
64. Cummings, supra note 58.
65. E.g. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1968) ("Rather than further
the dismantling of the dual system, the [voluntary] plan has operated simply to burden
children and their parents with a responsibility which Brown /placed squarely on the School
Board."); Raney v. Bd. of Ed., 391 U.S. 443 (1968); United States v. CRUCIAL, 722 F.2d
1182, 1189 (5th Cir. 1983) ("[M]agnet programs as desegregation techniques require care-
ful scrutiny by the district court."); United States v. School Dist. of Ferndale, 616 F.2d 895,
912 (6th Cir. 1980) ("'[F]reedom of choice' plans correct denial of equal protection of laws
to black students only where they effectuate a conversion to 'a unitary, non-racial system.'").
66. Cummings, supra note 58 (quoting William L. Taylor, then director of the Center
for National Policy Review at Catholic University, who maintained that, "The major defect of
this Justice Department settlement is that it simply does not accord with what the Constitu-
tion requires... it did not act in accordance with the law, and did not protect the rights of
the children of Bakersfield."). See also Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38.
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desegregation of Bakersfield. In an interview given after the set-
tlement, Judge Ohanian expressed his disappointment with the
settlement:
The punishment should fit the crime. Here's a school system
that had deliberately segregated for many years, including
busing to maintain segregation. Now, when they're finally
brought to justice, it would seem appropriate to me that since
they had compelled busing to create segregation, they ought
to be required to use busing to correct the segregation that
was brought about.,7
The Bakersfield desegregation case providesjust one example of
how the DOJ can infringe upon the statutory and constitutional
rights of American citizens through consent decrees. In this case,
the children compelled to attend segregated schools were the vic-
tims. ' s
D. Intimidation Through Litigation
The preceding three parts of this Section have shown that the
DOJ can usurp statutory or constitutional rights of Americans by
selective enforcement, brute political force, and consent decree, or
a combination of those means. A fourth mechanism available to
the DOJ is that of a simple civil prosecution, such as that in United
States v. Wagner,5 which involved the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and
its use during the Clinton Administration.
The FHA contains anti-discrimination provisions designed to
prevent interference with the operation of the Act.70 In 1991,
67. Cummings, supra note 58.
68. Of course, this was not the fate of every desegregation case when the Reagan Ad-
ministration took over the White House. The Reagan DOJ, for example, expressed a desire
to settle a segregation case with Charleston, South Carolina. Robert Pear, Justice Department
Moving Ahead with Charleston Segregation Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1981, at A18. However, the
case did eventually go to trial.James Feron, Why Yonkers? The Long Path to an Integration Order,
N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 19, 1988, at BI. This case probably received closer scrutiny from the Reagan
Administration because the Carter administration filed it and some others just before they
left the DOJ. Due to the last minute nature of these filings, the Reagan DOJ likely concluded
(correctly it would seem) that these cases would receive extra scrutiny from the press as a
measure of how the new regime would handle civil rights cases. Even with the potential
political and media pressure on the Administration to push these cases hard, the Reagan
DOJ withdrew from or settled all but two of these Carter desegregation cases.
69. United States v. Wagner, 940 R Supp. 972 (N.D. Tex. 1996).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2003) ("It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or
interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exer-
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eleven Fort Worth residents learned that neighbors were selling
their home to a county agency that planned to use it as a group
home for the mentally retarded. 7' The eleven filed suit in state
court claiming that the sale would violate local zoning restrictions
and were successful in obtaining a temporary injunction.72 They
also passed out leaflets that warned of decreased property values
and the inevitable influx of "drug disabled adults" if the commu-
nity allowed mentally retarded children into the neighborhood 3
Four years later, upon referral from the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD), the DOJ filed suit against the
Fort Worth residents for violating the anti-discrimination provi-
sions of the FHA. 4 The District Court for the Northern District of
Texas, in an opinion by Judge Barefoot Sanders, found the defen-
dants liable under the Fair Housing Act. In relevant part, the court
held that:
Defendants' state lawsuit is not protected by the First Amend-
ment because Defendants sought an illegal objective under
federal law: the exclusion of a group home for mentally re-
tarded children from their neighborhood because of the
disabilities of the children in violation of the FHA, as
amended.75
The court used prior statements of the defendants to conclude.
that they had filed their state court claim to discriminate against
the potential residents of the group home because of their disabil-
ity, and not to enforce the local zoning laws.76 The court levied
total damages and attorney's fees of $46,045.61 .
While the defendant's statements that "drug disabled adults"
would soon follow the mentally retarded children into their
neighborhood were discriminatory, the defendants still had a right
to protection under the First Amendment. According to Nat Hen-
toff, writer for The Washington Post, even the DOJ conceded that the
cised or enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the
exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or
3606 of this title.").
71. Nat Hentoff, Watch What You Say; The Government Is!, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1996, at
C7.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Wagner, 940 F. Supp. at 981.
76. Id. at 982.
77. United States v. Wagner, 930 E Supp. 1148, 1155 (N.D. Tex. 1996).
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leaflets passed out by the defendants constituted protected
speech.7s Furthermore, despite the district court's factual findings
concerning the invidious motives of the defendants, the temporary
injunction issued by the state court signaled that the defendants
were likely to succeed in their original local claim.79
Regardless of the intent of or the emotions behind the lawsuit, it
does not appear to have been baseless as a matter of state law. The
DOJ's decision to file suit rested on a belief that a suit with a basis
in state law "coerced, intimidated, threatened, or interfered" with
the right of their neighbors to sell their home."" This standard cre-
ates a wide range of cases in which the DOJ can use the anti-
discrimination provisions of the Fair Housing Act to silence pro-
tected speech that it does not want to hear."' Furthermore, cases
like Wagner can have a significant chilling effect on future parties
who wish to assert their constitutional rights. Similarly situated in-
dividuals and groups will think twice before exercising their rights
if they believe that they may face prosecution under a federal stat-
ute such as the FlA.
III. THE POLICY ISSUES
In most cases, there are no legal constraints on the Attorney
General's ability to wield the weapons discussed in Section 11.82
However, several policy considerations factor into an analysis of
whether checks on the DOJ's power would be in the best interest of
the United States and its citizens. These policy issues comprise
three major categories: efficiency, good government, and represen-
tation reinforcement.
78. Hentoff, supra note 71.
79. E.g., Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002) ("To obtain a
temporary injunction, the applicant must plead and prove three specific elements: (1) a
cause of action against the defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and (3) a
probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim.").
80. See 42 U.S.C. § 3617.
81. In fact, Hentoff notes that other suits similar in nature were filed in the same pe-
riod in the states of California and Michigan. Hentoff, supra note 71.
82. In the antitrust context, the Tunney Act levies certain requirements on consent
decrees and requires the court to examine the decree and ensure in is in the public interest.
15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (2003). For further discussion of this Act, see Section IV of this Note.
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A. Efficiency
In general, efficiency arguments favor leaving the DOJ with a
great deal of discretion in these matters. As the Teeter court pointed
out, plea-agreement right of appeal waivers allow the DOJ to con-
serve resources.83 This benefit also flows from the other tools
discussed in Section II. By choosing to focus on certain areas of
law, the DOJ is able to effect the agenda that, theoretically, the vot-
ers prefer. The DOJ can prevent costly litigation by using political
power to nudge entities in the directions the Administration wishes
them to go. In a similar way, consent decrees and example-setting
litigation save Department attorneys courtroom time, allowing
them to work more efficiently on their log of cases. On a broader
scale, the Teeter court recognized that discouraging frivolous ap-
84peals and lawsuits preserves judicial resources. ~ This is a central
defense of the DOJ's enforcement of the FHA's anti-discrimination
clauses.
As with all efficiency arguments, this analysis must factor in a
cost. In these cases, the cost of the efficient system is sentencing
integrity in individual verdicts, and the potential for large-scale
deprivation of individual and group rights.85 While the use of con-
sent decrees may appear voluntary in nature, a closer look at the
circumstances often reveals intentional or unintentional coercion.
It may also reveal a political agenda that violates current constitu-
tional and statutory law.
This cost, however, may not be as heavy as it first seems. If the
citizens elect a conservative to the presidency, that is an indication
that Americans want the DOJ to enforce the policies of the new
chief executive. The public often perceives conservatives as
tougher on crime:86 having elected a conservative, the people
would expect that administration to be tougher on criminals. This
may mean that allowing a criminal defendant to bargain away the
statutory right to an appeal, for example, is more palatable to the
majority of American citizens during that election cycle. If the
people elect a liberal, it could be an indication that the majority of
83. Teeter, 257 E3d at 22 ("The benefit to the prosecution-conservation of re-
sources-is obvious.").
84. Id.
85. Flanagan, supra note 37.
86. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking Federal Criminal Law: What's Law Got To Do With
It? The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of
(Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CGRIM. L. REv. 23, 41-44 (1997).
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Americans want the DOJ to focus on the FA and segregation in
public schools.
Viewed in this way, the overzealous or apathetic enforcement of
particular laws appears efficient. The legislature passes laws at the
place of the median voter:s7 the Attorneys General enforce these
laws with varying zeal depending on the position of a majority of
the citizens. The DOJ's is better able to adjust to public prefer-
ences year by year, while legislative amendments represent lasting
trends in public opinion. When viewed from a national policy per-
spective, the DOJ's discretion appears efficient. Efficiency at the
national level, however, comes at a loss to the individuals or groups
that may suffer a deprivation of their rights. Regardless of the effi-
cient nature of the current system, efficiency is no consolation to
those who lose the protections promised them by the Constitution
and laws of the United States.
B. Good Government
This efficiency argument is similar to the good government ar-
gument; good government is responsive to the people.8 When the
people elect a president, they trust that president to enforce the
law in keeping with the positions he expressed during his cam-
paign. Presumably, the majority will elect an individual who will
further its wishes. For this reason, the Attorney General has tradi-
tional prosecutorial discretion, 8 and can enforce the laws in the
manner in which the chief executive believes the citizens desire.
87. See, e.g., John D. Colombo, Why is Harvard Tax-Exempt? (And Other Mysteries of Tax-
Exemption for Private Educational Institutions), 35 ARIz. L. REV. 841, 874 (1993) ("Government
failure occurs as a result of the vagaries of the democratic system, which requires a majority
vote of the legislature to enact government programs. Economist Burton Weisbrod observed
that because of this phenomenon, minority blocs of voters will lack the voting strength to
force the government to meet their demand for certain goods and services. In effect, the
government will provide any good or service at approximately the demand of the median
voter, since any attempt to provide more than this will be voted down by the majority." (cit-
ing Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a Three-Sector
Economy, THE VOLUNTARY NONPROFIT SECTOR 51, 53-61 (Burton A. Weisbrod ed., 1977));
BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY 25-31 (1988).
88. See, e.g., E. Thomas Sullivan, Evolving Voices in Land Use Law: A Festschrift in Honor of
Daniel R. Mandelker, 3 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 473, 481 (2000) (citing Columbia v. Omni
Outdoor Ad., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 375 (1991)).
89. One poignant example of this discretion is the Cohen-Strong case. The DOJ
brought suit under the FHA on behalf of a poor mother whose landlords refused to relieve
her of routine fees despite her exceptional circumstances. After losing the case, the DOJ
decided not to appeal. Cohen-Strong, the victim, subsequently appealed without the DOJ
and won a reversal from the 9th Circuit. See United States v. Cal. Mobile Home Park Mgmt.
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An analogy to administrative law is useful, since the president
appoints the heads of regulatory agencies as well as the head of the
DOJ. The decisions of administrative agencies, like the decisions of
the DOJ, are largely a result of the political beliefs of the president.
Therefore, a brief discussion of administrative law may illustrate
the DOJ's broad discretion.
In Chevron v. NRDC, the Supreme Court responded to the ex-
pansion of legislative authority to the executive branch, holding
that executive agency interpretations of the statutes they enforce
are entitled to deference from the courts.9° This holding cleared
the way for increased executive law-making. Although the Constitu-
tion had originally reserved law-making to the legislative branch,
Justice Blackmun reasoned, "'in our increasingly complex soci-
ety... Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to
delegate power under broad general directives."'91
The administrative law analogy is imperfect, however, and does
not justify broad DOJ discretion. Legislative delegation to regula-
tory agencies is based upon an express or implicit statutory
authorization. 92 Congress grants the DOJ no such rule-making or
adjudicatory authority.
Furthermore, in United States v. Mead Corp.,9s the Supreme Court
began a retreat from Chevron. In Mead, the Court held that a regu-
Co., 29 F.3d 1413 (9th Cit. 1994); see also Ann Mariano, Ruling Favors the Disabled on Fee Issue;
Appeals Court Finds Some Housing Charges may Be Discriminatory, WASH. POST, September 24,
1994, at Fl.
90. Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). Countless
authors have written on Chevron deference and the Nondelegation Doctrine. It is not the
purpose of this section to rehash these arguments, but merely to provide an analogy to those
cases and that issue. The analysis here provides one way of examining these precedents, but
is not exhaustive of the potential arguments on this issue. For further information on agency
deference, see, e.g., ThomasJ. Byrne, The Continuing Confusion Over Chevron: Can the Nondele-
gation Doctrine Provide a (Partial) Solution?, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 715 (1997); Dan M. Kahan,
Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REv. 469 (1996); Ernest Gellhorn &
Paul Verkuil, Delegation: What Should We Do About It? Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20
CARDOZO I.. REV. 989 (1999); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristen E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89
GEO. L.J. 833 (2001); Eric R. Womack, Into the Third Era of Administrative Law: An Empirical
Study of the Supreme Court's Retreat from Chevron Principles in United States v. Mead, 107 DiCK. L.
REv. 289 (2002); William K. Shirley, Note, Accountability and Influence After Chevron: Is the
Regulatory State Consistent with Our Constitutional Heritage, 86 GEo. L.J. 2735 (1998).
91. Gellhorn, supra note 90, at 990 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
372 (1989) (holding that Congress did not delegate excessive legislative power or upset the
separation of powers amongst the branches in passing the Sentence Reform Act of 1984)).
92. Gellhorn, supra note 90, at 1007-12; Merrill, supra note 90, at 870-71 (citing Dunn
v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 519 U.S. 465, 479 n.14 (1997) ("Because 'the stat-
ute, as a whole, clearly expresses Congress' intention' to include foreign currency options
within the Treasury Amendment's exemption, administrative deference is improper." (quot-
ing Dole v. Steeelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 42 (1990))).
93. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
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latory agency only gets deference in its interpretation of legislation
if "it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency gen-
erally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise
of that authority. '04 While the nondelegation doctrine may not be
dead, the Court is still concerned about the unprincipled delega-
tion of law-making authority to the executive branch.9' Too much
law-making power in the hands of the executive branch creates
separation of powers problems. The lack of legislative delegation to
the DOJ and the Court's retreat from Chevron deference argue
against leaving the DOJ with unchecked discretion.
A policy of unchecked DOJ discretion meets another fundamen-
tal difficulty. The Framers designed the Constitution, at least in
part, to protect certain individual liberties against the actions of
the majority.9 The actions of the Attorney General may be efficient
and consistent with the views of the majority, but sacrificing certain
basic individual or minority-group rights at the insistence of the
majority runs counter to the principles of our constitutional sys-
tem.9
7
Making law is no longer a purely legislative function in this era
of expanding administrative law, but the legislature still controls
when and to whom it delegates its authority.98 Even if one accepts
the argument that broad DOJ discretion allows for the efficient
rule of the American majority, the question of where to draw the
line remains, as it does in the case of executive agencies. Allowing
the executive branch some discretion does create an efficient sys-
tem, but limiting that discretion would ensure that the DOJ does
not transform a responsive government into an oppressive one.
94. Id. at 226-27. See also Womack, supra note 90, at 311.
95. Mead, 533 U.S. at 337.
96. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 291 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the op-
pression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other
part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be
united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure."); Rex E. Lee, Fed-
eralism, Separation of Powers, and the Legacy of Garcia, 1996 BYU L. REv. 329, 329 (1996) ("The
Constitution's purpose is to protect the freedom of the individual.").
97. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton) ("It is here too that they
may be most pernicious. In the legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a
benefit. The differences of opinion, and the jarrings of parties in that department of the
government, though they may sometimes obstruct salutary plans, yet often promote delib-
eration and circumspection, and serve to check excesses in the majority.") (emphasis added)).
98. Of course, executive orders and the policies of the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) also govern agencies.
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C. Representation Reinforcement
A third policy theory relevant in this analysis is representation
reinforcement.99 In a representation reinforcement model, the
methods used to enforce the laws through the executive branch
could compensate for under-representation of certain parties in
the legislature or the courts-the inverse of the model first enun-
ciated by the Supreme Court in the famous fourth footnote of the
Caroline Products case. °00 A hypothetical example of this would be
enforcement of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
Over the past decade, the Supreme Court has come to adopt a
narrow definition of "disability" under the ADA."" Due to this nar-
row definition, courts have not been amenable to parties seeking
redress for potential violations of ADA rights.0 2 Individuals with
disabilities are currently underrepresented on the Supreme Court.
Under a representation reinforcement model, it would be proper
for the executive, through the means available to that branch, to
zealously enforce the provisions of the Act because such individuals
are under-represented in the branch normally assigned the duty of
interpreting the laws of the United States.
10 3
Since Caroline Products, academics have debated this approach to
democratic institutions. However, this model would only apply
where the DOJ exercised its discretion to help those underrepre-
sented in Congress or the courts. Therefore, this theory cannot
justify the settlement in the Bakersfield case discussed in Section II,
99. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements of Constitu-
tional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REv. 2062, 2267 (2002) (defining
representation reinforcement from a judicial perspective as a situation where "the Court
makes ajudgment as to whether the disadvantaged class can rely on the political process to
correct irrational laws that hurt them").
100. See United States v. Carolene Products, Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (ponder-
ing "whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry); see alsoJ. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
101. See Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law:
What Happened? Why?And What Can We Do About It , 21 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 139-
60 (2000).
102. See, e.g., Toyota v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 200-01 (2002) (holding that an employee
with a physical handicap must show impairment when performing a variety of life activities,
rather than the job for which the employee seeks reasonable accommodation).
103. One can easily envision a similar situation involving the legislative branch. For ex-
ample, African-Americans and Hispanics are underrepresented in Congress. Thus, under a
representation reinforcement model, it would be proper for the Civil Rights Division of the
executive branch to go further in enforcing civil rights laws that the legislature may have
intended.
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Part C-2. The African-American children potentially harmed by the
settlement are underrepresented minorities: rather than benefiting
from the questionable settlement, they are suffering the injury of
continued school segregation. 0 4 Because the laws of the United
States can be enforced in ways that both help and harm the under-
represented and historically oppressed, this model sheds little light
on the general constitutional and separation of powers issues at the
heart of the problem.
D. Summary of the Policy Issues
The DOJ has finite resources with which to carry out a great
number of possible enforcement actions.'0' Even if an Attorney
General wanted to vigorously enforce all congressional enact-
ments, such an ambitious goal would be impossible. The limited
availability of lawyers, funds, and investigative tools, in conjunction
with good government and efficiency arguments, justifies the
DOJ's discretion in allocating the majority of its focus and re-
sources. If the DOJ attempted to enforce all laws with equal vigor, it
would be unable to enforce any law properly. With different parties
and different agendas enforcing the law on a rotating basis, there
is a high likelihood that the DOJ will enforce the law in a manner
consistent with the changing political leanings of the American
public.
The Supreme Court has recognized that review of every agency
decision would tax the resources of both the DOJ and the courts.
For this reason, the courts defer to each executive agency's inter-
pretation of its authorizing statute. 0 6 Given that the DOJ is
responsible for the enforcement of a much broader set of statutes
than other executive agencies, which are each only responsible for
one specific area of regulation, it is appropriate to grant the DOJ
wide discretion in its day-to-day prosecutorial decisions. If Congress
became concerned about a chilling effect on fundamental rights, it
could amend or repeal statutes granting the DOJ authority to
prosecute. Furthermore, it may be unreasonable and inefficient to
demand that the Justice Department enforce all laws equally and
104. SeeCummings, supra note 58.
105. See, e.g., Richard J. Favretto, Settlement of Government and Private Cases: The Antitrust
Division, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 7, 11 (1981-1982) ("[R]esource limitations make the Depart-
ment [of Justice] realize that the settlement process is an obvious and important part of
antitrust enforcement.").
106. See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
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completely without prejudice. Nonetheless, there must be limita-
tions on the discretion to enter settlements. While the DOJ's
resources are limited, they are vast in comparison to the resources
of many of the parties with whom they litigate, such as indigent
defendants.' °7 This power imbalance, in addition to the fact that
many entities face repeated interactions with the executive branch,
creates the risk that the DOJ will consciously or unconsciously co-
erce parties to sign away their rights in settlements. The status quo
is not sufficient to protect parties in light of the DOJ's ability to
pursue policy goals. To assure that the DOJ does not unnecessarily
compromise the constitutional and statutory rights of third parties,
more rigorous standards are necessary.
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
One prerogative of the executive branch is the ability to control
law enforcement policy.'08 Any corrective mechanism to prevent
broad discretion over these day-to-day choices and large-scale pol-
icy decisions would meet heavy resistance from the executive
branch. Further, applying such restrictions to all DOJ decisions and
enforcement actions would be a bureaucratic nightmare. However,
Congress should address the concerns created by the broad discre-
tion wielded by the DOJ. Specifically, Congress needs to limit the
DOJ's ability to over-enforce or virtually ignore a particular law. It
also needs to check the DOJ's ability to impede the statutory or
constitutional rights of party opponents or third parties. Congress
can achieve these goals through a combination of traditional legis-
lative policing and passing an express authorization for an
increased judicial role in reviewing the validity of settlements
reached by the DOJ.
107. See, e.g., DeVaney supra note 52.
108. The Reagan and Bush I administrations strongly championed this kind of "cate-
gorical separationism" in relation to the functions of the executive and legislative branches.
"[C]ategorical separationists insist that reliance on the President's self-discipline is both
inevitable and sufficient to fulfill the rule of law ideal." Peter M. Shane, Presidents, Pardons,
and Prosecutors: Legal Accountability and the Separation of Powers, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 361,
386 (1993). While the 'sufficient' part may be questionable, this presidential discretion does
appear to be inevitable.
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A. Legislative Policing
Legislation is not Congress's only tool for monitoring the DOJ.'09
Congress can conduct hearings and issue reports on the conduct
of executive officials. For example, in 1984, the House Judiciary
Committee issued a 1,200-page report accusing former DOJ offi-
cials of withholding EPA files from Congress."l As a result of the
investigation, the Committee recommended that the Attorney
General appoint special counsel to review the allegations."'
The usefulness of this policing mechanism is limited. It is a pow-
erful tool to prevent gross misconduct, but it is less effective for
monitoring daily activities and decisions of the DOJ. Congress
could review DOJ inaction through its committee system. However,
without a legal standard for the level of Department enforcement,
it would be difficult to develop political pressure for the appoint-
ment of a special counsel. Congress can best use the legislative
committee system as it did in 1984, as a mechanism to check
grossly unlawful actions of officials in the executive branch.
B. Courts as Protectors
1. In Litigation-Under the Constitution, the courts protect in-
dividual liberties from unauthorized infringement by the legislative
or executive branches." 2 In this way, courts can serve as a check on
the Attorney General's ability to violate constitutional or statutory
law in litigation. An example of this occurred as recently as April
2002. In Oregon v. Ashcroft, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Oregon held that John Ashcroft's attempt to override Oregon's
109. Congress can use legislation to regulate a field that has already been subject to ju-
dicial consent decrees. However, this approach is corrective rather than proactive, and there
are potential constitutional constraints on Congress' ability to do this in every situation. See
Brian M. Hoffstadt, Retaking the Field: The Constitutional Constraints on Federal Legislation That
Displaces Consent Decrees, 77 WASH. U. L. Q. 53 (1999).
110. House Panel Hits FormerJustice Aides, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 6, 1985, §§ 1, 3.
111. Id.
112. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-178 (1803) ("It is emphatically the prov-
ince and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with
each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. So if a law be in opposition to
the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the
court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or
conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of
these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence ofjudicial duty.").
[VOL. 37:1
FALL 2003] Executing the Laws or Executing an Agenda
physician-assisted suicide law by applying the Federal Controlled
Substances Act was not a valid application of the federal statute."'
While the court decided the case strictly on statutory grounds,
4
courts can invalidate similar actions of the Attorney General on
constitutional grounds as well. Implicit in the decision is the idea
that the Constitution vests legislative authority in Congress and
that the Attorney General is limited to enforcement of that legisla-
tion rather than expansion of it.1
5
2. Reviewing Consent Decrees-Oregon v. Ashcroft illustrates that the
courts provide a check on DOJ actions through litigation. However,
the DOJ may still perpetrate constitutional and statutory abuses in
settlements.1 6 When, in Martin v. Wilks, the Supreme Court held
that a third party was not bound by a consent agreement between
the original parties,"7 Congress immediately overturned this deci-
sion."8 Presumably, Congress did not want the threat of future suits
by third parties to discourage settlements. However, despite Con-
gress's desire to protect settlement, the court still retains the ability
to review settlements in certain fields, such as antitrust.
113. Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1087 (D. Or. 2002)
114. Id. at 1093 ("I again emphasize that I resolve this case as a matter of statutory in-
terpretation.").
115. Id. at 1081, 1088.
116. The DOJ has often urged the Supreme Court not to approve civil rights settle-
ments that involve race-conscious remedies that go beyond those authorized by Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. However, the Supreme Court expressly rejected this position in
Local Number 93, International Ass'n of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986). Shane,
supra note 2.
117. 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989) ("A judgment or decree among parties to a lawsuit re-
solves issues as among them, but it does not conclude the rights of strangers to those
proceedings."). See also Christopher Edley, Jr., How to Save the Second Reconstruction, LEGAL
TIMES,July 24, 1989, at 24.
118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n) (2003) (providing that a judgment or consent decree en-
tered into in an employment discrimination case cannot be challenged "(i) by a person who,
prior to the entry of the judgment... had actual notice of the proposed judgment or order
... [and] a reasonable opportunity to present objections to such judgment or order; or (ii)
by a person whose interests were adequately represented by another person who had previ-
ously challenged the judgment or order on the same legal grounds and with a similar factual
situation, unless there has been an intervening change in law or fact").
This case is particularly interesting in that it involved the intervention of white firefighters
who felt they were being disadvantaged by an affirmative action program entered into in a
consent decree between the NAACP and Birmingham, A]. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 758. If
the situation of the minority actors were reversed, as in the Bakersfield case discussed in
Section II-C, a representation reinforcement model would have supported the court's inter-
vention. One wonders if Congress would have overturned this decision in the situation was
more like that of Bakersfield. The overruling statute cuts both ways. While it may express a
desire to help minorities in reaching helpful voluntary settlements, it may impair their abil-
ity to challenge harmful ones.
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a. Expansion of the Tunney Act-During the Watergate era, there
was growing suspicion of the executive branch due to the actions
of Richard Nixon." 9 In response, Congress passed the Tunney Act
in 1974. 12 The Act prescribes that settlements the DOJ reaches in
antitrust cases are reviewable by the courts. The DOJ must provide
to the court, as well as publish in the Federal Register, an account
of the case and the consent decree.12' The court has the power to
reject the consent decree if, in its estimation, it is not in the public
interest.2 2 In this way, the court provides a check on the DOJ's au-
thority to settle antitrust cases.
Commentators have criticized the Tunney Act as a result of
Judge Sporkin's application of the Act in the Microsoft antitrust123"t
case. "It is the executive's job," maintain Mark Leddy and Mi-
chael Shea, "not the judicial's to 'take care that the laws be
faithfully executed.- 12 4 Leddy and Shea further argue that the Act
violates policies behind the Supreme Court's holdings that the
courts cannot review an agency's decision not to bring an en-
forcement action. 12 5 Leddy and Shea believe that Congress should
modify the Tunney Act by "limiting judicial review to a determina-
119. Mark Leddy & Michael Shea, Reaching Consent Under a Judicial Shadow, LEGAL
TIMES, Apr. 10, 1995, at 45.
120. 15 U.S.C. § 16 (2000).
121. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) ("[T]he United States shall file with the district court, publish in
the Federal Register, and thereafter furnish to any person upon request, a competitive im-
pact statement which shall recite-
(1) the nature and purpose of the proceeding;
(2) a description of the practices or events giving rise to the alleged viola-
tion of the antitrust laws;
(3) an explanation of the proposal for a consent judgment, including an
explanation of any unusual circumstances giving rise to such proposal
or any provision contained therein, relief to be obtained thereby, and
the anticipated effects on competition of such relief;
(4) the remedies available to potential private plaintiffs damaged by the al-
leged violation in the event that such proposal for the consent
judgment is entered in such proceeding;
(5) a description of the procedures available for modification of such pro-
posal; and
(6) a description and evaluation of alternatives to such proposal actually
considered by the United States.").
122. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) ("Before entering any consent judgment proposed by the United
States under this section, the court shall determine that the entry of such judgment is in the
public interest."). Congress provided guidelines to the courts for reaching this determina-
tion in 15 U.S.C. § 16(f).
123. See, e.g., Leddy, supra note 119.
124. Id. at 45 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
125. Id. (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (holding that the FDA's decision
not to take enforcement actions requested by inmates was not subject to judicial review un-
der the Administrative Procedure Act)).
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tion that the parties have acted in good faith and that the DOJ has
not grossly abused its discretion."26
While it would be prudent to narrow judicial discretion in re-
viewing consent decrees, as Leddy and Shea suggest, applying the
general principles of the Act on a broader scale would help to
check the potential abuses of the DOJ. Given the ability of the DOJ
to abuse its discretion in fields beyond antitrust, Congress should
expand the Tunney Act to other fields of law. Such legislation
would require the courts to review consent decrees, and to assure
that they do not violate constitutional standards or statutory law.
Thus, Congress would expressly authorize the courts to scrutinize
settlements, such as that in the Bakersfield segregation case, but
would not allow the direct intervention of third parties that Con-
gress has specifically rejected. Consequently, the executive branch
would not decide for itself if its methods of law enforcement are
constitutional or statutorily permissible. Parties, of course, would
still be able to give up their rights in a consent decree, as long as
the court did not find such bargains to be unjust on a case-by-case
basis.
12 7
Under this proposal, the court's role would remain limited. It
would merely confirm that the consent decree did not unjustly vio-
late any party's constitutional or statutory rights. 2 This extra step
will be no more taxing on government and judicial resources than
the Tunney Act is presently in the antitrust field. In fact, courts
should already be taking this step as a matter of law. Under Local
No. 93 v. Cleveland, a consent decree "must further the objectives of
the law upon which the complaint was based."09 However, courts
do not scrutinize the legal ramifications of voluntary agreements as
closely as they do judgments derived from the adversarial proc-
126. Leddy, supra note 119.
127. This part of the test is similar to the present fairness test that courts generally apply
in reviewing consent decrees. The courts, while they have had the authority to examine
consent decrees for fairness between the parties, are beginning to assert this authority more
willingly in areas like waivers of appellate rights in criminal cases.
128. The Supreme Court has applied a similar standard in civil rights cases. For exam-
ple, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), the Court faced the issue of when
government officials can assert qualified immunity as an affirmative defense to a lawsuit.
The Court held that "government officials performing discretionary functions generally are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly estab-
lished statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Id. at
818 (emphasis added). Congress, within the limitation of this standard, can provide proce-
dures and factors for consideration as it sees fit, in a similar manner to the present Tunney
Act.
129. Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 525.
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ess.13 0 Further statutory guidance would prompt courts to exercise
their authority to review consent decrees, and would provide clear
authorization for a court to void a facially voluntary agreement be-
tween litigants.
This procedure can provide clarity on legal issues and may actu-
ally contribute to the conservation of judicial and DOJ resources
over time. For example, in United States v. Olin Corp., a district
court, in a relatively rare exercise of its authority under Local No.
93, rejected a consent decree reached between the DOJ and Olin
Corp. The consent decree allowed for retroactive liability under
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA).' 3' The court found that CERCLA could
not apply retroactively without exceeding Congress' authority un-
der the Commerce Clause. 132 Although the Eleventh Circuit
subsequently reversed this decision, holding that CERCLA can ap-
ply retroactively and that the consent decree was valid, the lower
court's review of the consent decree was never questioned. 133 This
gives the DOJ a stronger hand in future cases and may encourage
companies to settle rather than fight the DOJ in court.
The Olin case demonstrates that, in the context of a standard
fairness review of consent decrees, courts do occasionally examine
the constitutional and statutory ramifications of the decree. By
modifying and expanding the principles of the Tunney Act, Con-
gress can provide a uniform check on the DOJ and the potential
for settlements to evade statutory and constitutional law. However,
it does not allow third party intervention in every case, and does
not expand the court's subject matter jurisdiction beyond the case
before it. At a minimum, this will shine more light on these de-
crees by bringing their results into the mainstream of legal
discussion and debate while keeping their negotiation private. This
minimum of extra scrutiny will help restrain the DOJ in efforts to
unjustly promote its policy goals.
b. The Judicial Standards for a DOJ Consent Decree-Codifying judi-
cial review of consent decrees as described in Subpart (a) requires
130. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne & Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., A Prelude to the Settlement of
Wilder, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 177, 188 (1987); O'Mullan, supra note 34; Eric A. Rosand,
Consent Decrees in Welfare Litigation: The Obstacles to Compliance, 28 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS.
83, 104 (1994) ("A consent decree ... is negotiated behind closed doors, with few proce-
dural protections.").
131. United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Al. 1996).
132. Id. at 1533. See also District Court ReJects Superfund's Retroactive Reach, CoMm. LENDING
LITIG. NEws,June 24, 1996, Vol. IX, No. 4.
133. United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997). See also Eleventh Circuit
Reverses Controversial Olin Decision, Declares CERCLA Constitutional, REAL Es-
TATE/ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY NEWS, Apr. 18, 1997, Vol. VIII, No. 12.
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a uniform standard of review. Supreme Court doctrine offers a
number of possible standards. For example, the courts could re-
view DOJ consent decrees for compliance with settled
constitutional law principles.3 4 Another possible solution would be
for the courts to give the DOJ Chevron deference when entering
into consent decrees. By holding the DOJ to a reasonable interpre-
tation of the law on which it bases its settlement, the courts would
treat the DOJ like any other executive agency.15 However, because
settlements affect first and third parties differently each of these
standards of review are required, albeit in different situations.
i. Rights of a Party to the Litigation-The first situation is that in
which a party to the litigation is coerced to sacrifice a right, rather
than voluntarily give it up. The case of criminal defendants waiving
their statutory right to appeal sentences exemplifies this situa-
tion.'36 Here, the Teeter court's standard is the proper one. Private
parties can voluntarily waive their rights in a consent decree. Since
the consent decree in these cases only affects the rights of the par-
ties involved, the standard is whether the waiver is truly voluntary.
In making this determination, the court would weigh the facts of
the case as the First Circuit did in Teeter. An entity with knowledge
and resources, like a large private company, usually waives its rights
knowingly in a consent decree. It has the legal knowledge and
monetary resources necessary to determine if the case is worth liti-
gating. In contrast, an indigent defendant is likely to be coerced
due to a lack of knowledge and resources. As the Teeter court con-
cluded, courts must examine these waivers on a case-by-case basis.
3 1
ii. Rights of Third Parties-When a consent decree between the
DOJ and a party opponent usurps the constitutional or statutory
rights of a third party, the question of what standard courts should
apply is more difficult to answer. In entering into such a consent
decree, the DOJ effectively avoids full argument on the legal issues
and the opportunity for third parties to intervene in the litiga-
tion. 13 The purpose of scrutinizing these consent decrees is to
prevent the DOJ from avoiding constitutional and statutory obliga-
tions. Therefore, the logical conclusion appears to be application
134. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 800.
135. See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837.
136. See supra note 9.
137. Teeter, 257 F.3d at 26.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., Rosand, supra note 130.
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of the same judicial analysis to a consent decree as would be ap-
plied to a case argued before the court.
This standard is simpler in some cases than in others. For exam-
ple, a consent decree that imposes a prior restraint on a third
party's speech would, under settled constitutional law, trigger strict
scrutiny.'40 Government actions imposing a prior restraint almost
never survive the strict scrutiny test, and thus any such consent de-
cree would be invalid. However, not all constitutional and statutory
standards are as clear as the ban on prior restraints on speech.
While the Bakersfield segregation consent decree appears to violate
constitutional standards under the Court's school segregation
precedents, the point is arguable. The problem these situations
present is that any standard Congress can create is malleable, since
the precedents of constitutional law itself are malleable. The best
way to approach this problem, therefore, is to create two different
standards of review for consent decrees that usurp the rights of
third parties-one standard when the settlement implicates statu-
tory rights, and another, stricter standard when constitutional
rights are at stake.
In enforcing statutory law, Congress should provide for Chevron-
like deference when the DOJ's consent decree is reasonable under
the statute being enforced. Congress should also clarify that a dis-
trict court's decision not to sign a DOJ consent decree is subject to
appellate review. In such cases, the DOJ is acting much like a fed-
eral regulatory agency, and should receive deference in its
interpretations of statutory law. Furthermore, greater scrutiny
would be counterproductive. If the DOJ faced strict judicial scru-
tiny each time it enforced a statute, it might exercise its
prosecutorial discretion and not sue under that statute at all. A
Chevron-like standard secures the statutory rights of third parties
without impairing the enforcement of statutory law as a whole . In
contrast, where a consent decree arguably infringes on the consti-
tutional rights of a third party, courts should analyze it under the
same constitutional standards as if the case had gone to trial. It is
the judiciary's duty to interpret the Constitution; the executive
branch should not decide for itself whether its methods of law en-
forcement meet constitutional standards.14 1 If a court applied a less
140. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-14 (1931) ("The liberty of the press
is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous re-
straints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when
published. Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before
the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is
improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the consequence of his own temerity.").
141. See, e.g., Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
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stringent standard of review than that usually applied to a constitu-
tional analysis of the same legal issue, the DOJ would have
effectively avoided that standard and potentially harmed third par-
ties. Constitutional liberties are fundamental to our society, and
require an extra degree of protection from DOJ encroachment.
c. Potential Problems
i. Deference to the DOJ-Perhaps the most difficult problem with
codifying judicial review of DOJ consent decrees is the application
of deference to the DOJ when a statutory right of a third party is at
issue. The Chevron standard is inherently malleable, regardless of
how the Supreme Court limits its application. This is as true for
DOJ consent decrees as for administrative agency decisions. While
one court may find the DOJ's actions reasonable, another court
may rule otherwise. Implementing this standard runs the risk of
subjecting all DOJ settlements to judicial scrutiny and seriously in-
hibiting the law enforcement process.
While this is a viable concern, such a standard still represents an
improvement from the status quo. The deference standard has not
significantly slowed the expansion of administrative regulation, as
is evident by the rapid growth of regulatory law. Periodically, courts
have found that agencies have acted unreasonably under the two-
pronged Chevron test. On a day-to-day basis, however, agencies act
within their discretion without undue interference from the judici-
ary. Furthermore, Chevron deference is much more forgiving to the
DOJ than expansion of the current Tunney Act policy to DOJ con-
sent decrees, which would make every decision subject to ajudicial
public interest analysis. Finally, district court decisions to reject
DOJ consent decrees will still be subject to appellate scrutiny. This
provides another protection against abuse of discretion by district
courts when applying the deference standard to consent decrees.
This solution is not a perfect one, but it has two significant
benefits. First, it does not constitute a major departure from the
ideals endorsed in Supreme Court precedents. Instead, it serves to
create a unified standard for the review of DOJ consent decrees by
federal courts. Second, some level of guaranteed judicial analysis
will serve to protect individual and group rights from the powers of
political coercion far better than the current system protects those
rights. When one balances the risks of a slightly increased burden
on the DOJ with the potential protection of fundamental individ-
ual and group liberties, it becomes apparent that, while imperfect,
the deference standard represents a viable solution.
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ii. Legal or Political Problems- When do Courts Step In ?-The appli-
cation of constitutional standards to consent decrees creates
difficulties. First, district courts will apply constitutional standards
differently from one district court to another, as they will apply
deference differently. While this standard may lead to some incon-
sistency at the district court level, the appeals process can serve as a
check on district court reviews of consent decrees in the same way
it serves as a check on their decisions after a trial. 142 Second, Con-
gress has stated its opposition to allowing third parties to directly
oppose consent decrees in the courts. 143 This proposed form ofju-
dicial review is different, however, since actual intervention of the
third party would further minimize the chances of settlement of
the case. This proposal will not affect the chances of reaching a
lawful settlement. Settlement is still a desired goal, as long as the
consent decree reached does not overstep the bounds of the Con-
stitution.
Finally, while this change may solve the perceived problem as a
theoretical matter, there is some question as to whether it would
truly change anything in practice. Commentators routinely criticize
courts, particularly the Supreme Court, for deciding cases based on
politics rather than law. 44 Regardless of the exact language Con-
gress may use in drafting statutes authorizing review of DOJ
consent decrees, the result may ultimately be the transfer of inher-
ently political decisions from the executive branch to an un-elected
judiciary branch. 45 Yet courts, like the district court in Olin, can
already invalidate settlements on these grounds. Providing uni-
form, detailed guidelines and procedures can only minimize,
rather than exacerbate, this problem.
C. Summary of Possible Solutions
The DOJ's discretion in law enforcement may produce inconsis-
tent implementation of certain laws. However, any procedure to
force the Department to enforce certain laws more or less vigor-
ously creates problems of efficiency and legal standards. Congress
142. See Olin Corp., 107 F.3d at 1506.
143. See42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n) (2000).
144. See, e.g., Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1971, 1973 (1990)
("The Supreme Court has never sustained significant independence from the demands of
ordinary politics, and likely never will.").
145. See, e.g., Shane, supra note 108, at 383 ("[T]he Constitution cannot execute itself.
Human beings must implement the Constitutional text, and the text's operational, rather
than denotative, meaning determines the document's efficacy.").
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does have control over the language of statutes that authorize the
DOJ to prosecute cases, and can manipulate that language to pre-
vent prosecutions that could chill constitutional rights. While this
gives the legislative branch the ability to monitor some of the cases
brought by the executive branch, the powers of unchecked politi-
cal force and settlement authority remain in the arsenal of the
DOJ.
As noted in Section II, parties can usually check the use of brute
political force, like that used by Meese's Pornography Commission,
by seeking a preliminary injunction against illegal coercion by the
DOJ. The weakness in this mechanism is that some parties may
have ongoing relationships with the executive branch that make
them hesitant to fight every illegitimate use of executive author-
ity. 46 However, in the Playboy case, Playboy was not actually on the
blacklist, but was a directly affected third party. 47 Groups or indi-
viduals other than those directly interacting with the DOJ can
challenge any unconstitutional effect of the abuse of political in-
fluence by the DOJ, so long as they have standing. The standard
tools of temporary and permanent injunctions, therefore, are ade-
quate to check DOJ actions that take place entirely outside of the
judicial system.
In contrast, the status quo is not enough to prevent the DOJ from
abusing its authority through settlements. Congress should expand
the Tunney Act to cover other areas of DOJ enforcement, such as
civil rights issues, while modifying its scope to curtail questionable
application of the act by zealous courts. Under this new legislation,
Congress should require courts to, review consent decrees to en-
sure that a party's sacrifice of constitutional or statutory rights is
fair in light of the other terms of the decree. When third parties'
constitutional rights are implicated, standard trial-type judicial re-
view should apply, but when a statutory interpretation is at issue,
the court should defer to the DOJ. With minimal costs in efficiency
and resources, this change would provide a check on the DOJ's
unbridled authority to evade statutory and constitutional require-
ments through consent decrees.
146. See, e.g., Shane, supra note 2.
147. Meese, 639 E Supp. at 583-84.
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CONCLUSION
The president's policy preferences will inevitably color the DOJ's
decisions regarding which cases to prosecute and how to enforce
the laws passed by Congress. In this way, the spoils of electoral vic-
tory go to the executive branch in the same way that the fruits of
legislative power go to the party that wins a majority in Congress. 48
However, concerns that transcend partisan politics arise when the
DOJ's actions are questionable on statutory and, especially, consti-
tutional grounds. The status quo does not provide an effective
mechanism to assure the Attorney General is acting within the
boundaries of the law the Office is sworn to enforce.
With the exception of rare cases like Olin, courts often sign off
on consent decrees without so much as a statement of why the set-
tlement falls within the reasonable bounds of the law governing
the dispute. Many of these consent decrees, while occasionally
noted in newspapers and press releases, never permeate the main-
stream of American consciousness. Courts are already beginning to
give certain settlements involving the DOJ closer scrutiny. Codify-
ing this process is not a radical change in the law, but rather a
legislative reminder of the duty a court has to look into these con-
sent decrees with some scrutiny. Legislation would create uniform
standards for all federal courts to use when reviewing consent de-
crees. Congress should be proactive and announce a policy on how
far courts should go in examining these settlements. Otherwise it
could be faced with a court decision that expands the role of the
judicial branch beyond the bounds that it, or the executive branch,
desires.
148. As a matter of interest, the phrase "To the victor go the spoils" is attributed to
Senator William Learned Marcy in 1832. In its original form, the quote was "They (Democ-
rats) see nothing wrong in the rule that to the victor belong the spoils of the enemy."
GREGORY Y. TITELMAN, RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF AMERICA'S POPULAR PROVERBS AND
SAYINGS (2000).
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